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Is (1) refinery equipment including structures rising 100 feet
in the air, or (2) steel making equipment including a continuous
rolling mill weighing 900 tons, or (3) a pottery tunnel kiln 340 feet
long, 11 feet wide and 7 feet high, or (4) a theatre building or other
similar special purpose building, personal property for Ohio tax
purposes? Affirmative answers to the first three questions have
been given by the Supreme Court of Ohio, in Zangerle v. Standard
Oil Company,' Standard Oil Company v. ZangerIe,2 Zangerle v.
Republic Steel Corporatio, 3 and Roseville Pottery, Inc. v. County
Board of Revision of Muskingum County et al.4 A negative answer
is indicated to the fourth question both from the background of
the foregoing decisions and from the constitutional and statutory
provisions upon which classification of property for tax purposes
must depend. Cf. Reed v. County Board of Revision.5
In the Standard Oil, Republic Steel and Roseville Pottery de-
cisions, the various items of property involved were held to be
personal property and within the classification "engines, machinery,
tools and implements" of Section 5388, General Code, and therefore
taxable at 50 per cent of true value. These four decisions all took
place between 1945 and 1948 and were the first cases to reach
the Supreme Court for an authoritative exposition of the amend-
ment of Article XII, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution effective in
1931 and the personal property tax law providing for classification
of certain property for taxation passed by the legislature the same
year.
Since these decisions a lively speculation has arisen as to the
effect which they might have upon the tax structure of the taxing
units of the state. On the one hand they have brought hope to
certain heavy industries that the full benefits of classification
might be extended to all industry. This they believe was the
purpose and intent of the constitutional and legislative changes
* Of the firm of Squire, Sanders and Dempsey.
1 144 Ohio St. 506, 60 N.E. 2d 52 (1945).
2 144 Ohio St. 523, 60 NX.. 2d 59 (1945).
3 144 Ohio St. 529, 60 N.E. 2d 170 (1945).
4 149 Ohio St. 89, 77 N.E. 2d 608 (1948).
5 152 Ohio St. 207, 88 N.E. 2d 701 (1949).
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in 1931. On the other hand, the decisions have caused great concern
to local taxing officials lest not only industrial structures in the
nature of "engines, machinery, tools and implements" but com-
mercial special purpose structures such as theatres, hotels, grand-
stands and office buildings might not also secure the benefits of
classification under the law as interpreted in these decisions. These
fears led to several proposals during the recent session of the legis-
lature for statutory changes which would have substantially limited
the classification provisions of the 1931 enactment. It is believed
that a careful analysis of the constitutional and statutory pro-
visions as construed and applied by the supreme court in its
decisions referred to will show that the fears of the local taxing
officials are without foundation.
It is the purpose of this article to appraise the classification
problem, considering first the background of the classification law
and, second, the legal theory adopted by the supreme court in its
decisions construing and applying that law in the cases referred
to above, and, third, the present state of the law.
History and Purpose of Classification of Property for Tax Purposes
As pointed out by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Zangerle v.
The Standard Oil Company of Ohio,6 prior to 1931 it was immaterial
for Ohio tax purposes whether property was classified as real or
personal. From 1852 to January 1, 1931, the taxation of Ohio prop-
erty was governed by the "uniform rule." Immediately prior to its
amendment, this rule was set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of the
Ohio Constitution in the following words:
Laws shall be passed, taxing by a uniform rule, all moneys,
credits, investments in bonds, stocks, joint stock companies,
or otherwise, and also all real and personal property ac-
cording to its true value in money * * *
As early as 1925, the Ohio General Assembly recognized that
tax laws enacted pursuant to this rule were difficult to administer,
imposed inequitable tax burdens on certain taxpayers, and placed
Ohio businessmen and farmers at a competitive disadvantage with
persons. similarly engaged in neighboring states. Therefore, by
Amended Senate Joint Resolution Number 29 of 1925, the legislature
authorized the appointment of a joint committee to investigate
and study the laws of Ohio and other states with a view to deter-
mining the best and most equitable methods of taxation and to rec-
ommend needed legislation to carry such methods into effect. The
chairman of this committee was Chester C. Bolton, and its vice-
chairman and secretary was Robert A. Taft. In 1926, the committee
6 144 Ohio St. 506, 511, 60 N.E. 2d 52, 55 (1945).
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filed a report consisting of some 270 pages in which the tax laws
of the State of Ohio and other states were examined. The report
gave extended consideration to the problems of taxation and
revenue confronting Ohio and to the overall economy of the state.
The joint committee in its report concluded that the constitutional
requirement of complete uniformity in taxation prevented any
adequate reform of taxation in Ohio and therefore recommended
its repeal.
The Committee devoted a large portion of its report to pointing
out the defects and disadvantages of the uniform rule, stating,
among other things, as follows:
4. The uniform rule puts Ohio at a very serious dis-
advantage as compared with states not having this limita-
tion.
In these days of free interchange of goods between
all parts of the country there is much competition between
industries located in different states. This applies to the pro-
ducts of agriculture as well as manufacturing. If one state
has a tax system which is less favorable to agriculture,
manufacturing, and to business in general than the tax
systems of surrounding and competing states, the state is
suffering under a distinct handicap. Ohio is in such a
position. Certain nearby states which have great industrial
and agricultural development have tax systems which are
notably more favorable and equitable to these vital
activities."
Upon receipt of this report, the legislature proposed a constitutional
amendment of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution. This
proposed amendment was submitted to the people and adopted by
them at the election of 1929, the schedule to the amendment pro-
viding that it should become effective January 1, 1931. This
amendment removed the constitutional direction to tax the various
kinds of property theretofore included under the uniform rule
and replaced it with the following language. "Land and improve-
ments thereon shall be taxed by uniform rule according to value."
It should be noted that, whereas this section of the Constitution
had previously required the taxation inter alia of "real property,"
by uniform rule, the amendment required only that "land and im-
provements thereon" be taxed by uniform rule. The constitutional
provision as thus amended left it open to the legislature to prescribe
the manner in which property other than "land and improvements
thereon" should be taxed.
Thereafter, a Special Joint Taxation Committee was appointed
7 Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Economy and Taxation,
Eighty-Sixth General Assembly, p. 140.
8 113 On'o LAWS 790 (1929).
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with Robert A. Taft as Chairman, under the provisions of Senate
Joint Resolution Number 7. This committee drafted an act com-
pletely revising the system of taxation in Ohio and reported it to
the Eighty-Ninth General Assembly. in 1931, which passed it at the
same session.9 In the field of property taxes, the following changes
among others were made:
1. All tangible property not used in business with the
exception of boats, aircraft, and domestic animals was re-
moved from the General Property Duplicate. Domestic
equipment and furniture found in every home as well as
personal effects including jewelry were thereby left
untaxed.
2. Intangible property such as stocks, bonds, and credits
were taken off the General Property Duplicate and taxed at
low fiat rates.
3. Licensed motor vehicles were removed from the
General Property Duplicate and subjected instead to a
graduated license tax.
4. Engines, machinery, tools, and implements used in
manufacturing and mining were to be assessed at 50% of
true value.
5. Engines, machinery, tools, implements, and domestic
animals used in agriculture were to be assessed at 50% of
true value.
6. Raw material, work in process and finished inven-
tory of manufacturers in the county of manufacture and
agricultural products were to be assessed at 50% of true
value.
7. All other tangible personal property was to be listed
at 70% of true value excepting that of certain public utili-
ties which was to be listed at 100%.
The first three of these changes were particularly designed for
the relief of the individual taxpayer with respect to burdensome
taxation of non-business property which had made liars out of most
taxpayers and martyrs of the few who honestly returned such
property. The substantial measure of relief thus afforded individuals
appears to be a fair quid pro quo for the balance of the changes
designed for business and farming and to remove the considerable
disadvantage of these groups in comparison with other states.
The favorable tax provisions thus made for business and farm-
ing were designed, in the long run, to increase the total tax
revenue'0 of the state through attracting to Ohio industries which
might otherwise locate elsewhere, as well as encouraging expansion
9 114 Omo LAws 714 (1931).
10 Statistics supplied by the Division of Research on Statistics of the De-
partment of Taxation indicate that the total value of tangible personal property
listed for taxation in 1933 was $710,303,773. In 1948 the tax duplicate of tangible
personal property had increased to $2,597,768,847.
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of the industries already in the state. As pointed out by the
supreme court:
* * * the General Assembly has in its classification
given a ,lower rate to the machinery and implements of
manufacturing concerns than it has placed on- other per-
sonal property. This shows an obvious intention to favor
manufacturing concerns, in the taxation of their property,
in order to make Ohio an attractive state for new business
which, in the long run, will result in more taxes because
of more property, as well as furnishing greater oppor-
tunities in this state for both business and labor.11
The Legal Basis of the Decisions
When the legislature enacted the personal property tax law in
1931 it left to the tax administration and to the courts the deter-
mination of what would be "improvements" on land and what
would be personal property. Following enactment of the law the
Tax Commission, which was charged with the assessment of per-
sonal property, prepared a number of rules classifying various
articles of property as between improvements on land and personal
property. These rules were intended for the guidance of local
assessing officials whose duty it was to assess "land and improve-
ments thereon." They were likewise intended for the guidance of
taxpayers who were required to report personal property for taxa-
tion under the new law. These rules with a few modifications were
repromulgated by the Tax Commissioner following reorganization
of the old Tax Commission in 1939. Except as modified by court
decisions, these rules are still in effect. With the assessment of
land and improvements remaining in the county auditors and the
assessment of personal property in the hands of the Tax Com-
missioner, controversies arose between the Tax Commissioner and
some of the county auditors as to how certain property should be
classified. Similarly, some of the industrial taxpayers were not
satisfied with the classification rule as it applied to them. This led
to litigation which resulted in the supreme court decisions herein
discussed.
The first case, Zangerle v. Standard Oil Company,12 concerned
machinery and equipment, including tanks, used in an oil refinery.
In describing such equipment the Court said: 13
"11Roseville Pottery, Inc. v. County Board of Revision of Muskingum
County et al., 149 Ohio St. 89, 98, 77 N. E. 2d 608, 613 (1948).
12 Non: 6, Supra.
13 144 Ohio St. 506, 509, 60 N.E. 2d 52, 54 (1945). In general, this machinery
and equipment may be described roughly as follows: "Tools, instruments;
meters; motors, turbines; engines; generators; ovens; dryers; scales; condensers;
1950]
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It is undisputed that this machinery and equipment are
used as a part of a continuous refining process; that they are
unique in character, being specially designed for the
oil-refining business and are useless for any other business
or industry; and that these refining structures are ponder-
ous in size, of iron, steel, brick and concrete construction,
and firmly and stably annexed to concrete foundations by
foundation bolts.
The taxpayer owned the land and buildings to which the equipment
was affixed. It was held that the property in question was not
"land and improvements thereon" and should be assessed at 50%
of its true value under Section 5388, General Code.
The law of the case as stated in syllabus 6 follows:
Machinery installed on land for the benefit of an industry
located thereon, which, if the industry itself was removed
would be of no particular benefit to the naked land, cannot
be considered for tax purposes an improvement on land,
but personal property.
Hart, J., speaking for the majority, proceeded to ascertain the
meaning of "land and improvements thereon" by drawing upon the
Ohio law of fixtures. The court said in substance that in construing
"improvements" on land, it could rely on Teaff v. Hewitt , 3a which
adopted the combined application of three requisites as the criterion
of a fixture: (1) actual annexation to the realty or something appur-
tenant thereto; (2) appropriation to the use or purpose of the realty
with which it is connected; and (3) intention of the party making
the annexation to make the article a permanent accession to the free-
hold.14
condenser boxes; coolers; exchangers; bubble towers; fractionating towers;
compressors; stills; reflux, soaking, stripping and receiving drums; pumps and
accessories; tanks and accessories; cranes and crane runways; hoists and con-
veyors; and, with certain exceptions, water treating plants complete; pipe still
unit and accessories complete, including process water-cooling towers; con-
tinuous crude and coke stills and accessories complete; agitators and acid plant
complete; steam-still units and accessories complete; gas absorption plant
complete; cracking units and accessories complete; water-pumping station
complete; boilers, plants and accessories complete; and reducing stills and
accessories complete * ** ". 144 Ohio St. 506, 510, 60 N.E. 2d 52, 54 (1945).
The following were conceded by the Oil Company to be realty and con-
sequently were not involved in this case: "Buildings, including built-in heating,
ventilating, plumbing, sprinkling, lighting, sanitary and drinking water systems;
foundations for all units; brick and concrete stacks and chimneys; embank-
ments and fills; fire banks and fire walls; retaining walls and other brick and
concrete walls; paving and driveways; bridges and tunnels; railroad tracks,
switches and trestles; fences; pits, cisterns, culverts, masonry, underground
flues and water wells; drain, sewers and plumbing; and other such like
property permanently attached to the land." See 144 Ohio St. 506, 508-9, 60 N.E.
2d 52, 54 (1945).
18a Ohio St. 511 (1853).
14 144 Ohio St. 506, 513, 60 N.E. 2d 52, 56 (1945).
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In applying these tests, the court held that only a slight annex-
ation was necessary to satisfy the first test. Of more importance Was
the test of appropriation. As to this, Ohio precedents established the
rule that articles which were annexed to the land to carry on a
particular business, but which were not suitable for other businesses
or designed for the use of the land itself, were appropriated to the
business rather than the land. Only articles annexed to the premises
as accessory to the land without regard to the particular business
carried on became subservient to the realty and acquired its
character. The test of intention was to be inferred from a variety
of factors.1 5
While all three requirements of annexation, appropriation and
intention must be met to find that a chattel has become part of the
real estate, it is apparent from the cases that the test of appropria-
tion is controlling in the case of manufacturing equipment as suf-
ficient annexation normally exists. In the case of special purpose
manufacturing equipment the requirement of appropriation to
the land is not met and intention becomes immaterial. In the case
of general motive power equipment, where the test of appropriation
is met, an intention to affix permanently will ordinarily be inferred.
The second case, The Standard Oil Co. v. Zangerle,'6 concerned
the machinery and equipment of two steam boiler plants and two
water treating plants in the same oil refineries. Again, of course,
the taxpayer owned the land and buildings to which the chattels
were affixed. The boiler plants were used to supply motive power for
operating pumps and to supply steam used in the refining process.
The water plants were used solely for treating water to be converted
into steam. Although firmly affixed to the realty, it was found
that these items were used primarily in producing steam required
in the process of distillation and only incidentally for supplying
motive power. Further, the boilers were designed particularly for
this purpose They operated at low steam pressure and did not con-
tain the super heating equipment usual in steam boilers which are
designed for power purposes. They could not be used economically
except in a refinery or similar industry.
The court again applied the three tests of Teaff v. Hewitt and
found that this equipment was not "land and improvements there-
on." Its annexation to the land clearly appeared but it was just as
clear that the equipment was appropriated to the use of a particular
business for it could not be used on the land for carrying on any
other type of business. For this reason it was to be distinguished
from motive power equipment found to be real property in Case
15 144 Ohio St. 506, 519, 60 N.. 2d 52, 58 (1945).
16 144 Ohio St. 523, 60 NX.. 2d 59 (1945).
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Manufacturing Co. v. Garven,17 or said to be real property in
Teaff v. Hewitt.18
Here the court found that the owner's intention that the
property be personalty was "clearly evidenced by the special design
of the boiler houses in question and the purpose and use for which
the annexation was made and to which all such machinery and
equipment are devoted."'19 Thus again the court considered the
appropriation test of paramount importance.
The tiird case was Zangerte v. Republic Steel Corporation.20
Here again the taxpayer owned the land and buildings to which
the equipment in question was affixed. The property included
was the processing machinery and equipment located in its hot
and cold strip mills. As described by the court,2 '
The corporation is engaged in converting steel in the form
of slabs into hot roll sheets and plates and cold roll finished
sheets and strips. The items in question involve machinery
and equipment of various sizes and various weights ranging
from 750 pounds to almost 950 tons. They were designed to
produce the above products and many of the items are
directly related to each other to effect continuous operation.
The machines of the production line are interconnected so
as to insure a continuous flow of product Most of the units,
depending on their size, are supported by foundations
which were specially designed therefor. These consist of
concrete blocks, piers or bearing walls of varying mass, size
and elevation. The foundation blocks, piers and walls for
the heavy equipment are generally built on concrete foun-
dation mats which are supported by piling, while lighter
equipment is supported by or rests on the floor. Practically
all the machines are especially designed to produce the pro-
ducts of the mill and are not adapted for any other purpose.
It was held that all of this equipment including the mats and equip-
ment foundations, was not "land and improvements thereon" and
was properly taxed as personal property.
Turner, J., speaking for the majority, reiterated the court's
adoption of the three tests laid down in Teaff v. Hewitt in ascertain-
ing the meaning of "improvements to land" Additional light was
thrown on the test of appropriation. The court pointed out that
fulfillment of this test requires that the chattel be something that
may be used by succeeding users of the land, saying: 22
17 45 Ohio St. 289, 13 N.E. 49 (1887).
18 1 Ohio St. 511, 542 (1853). This equipment was not before the court be-
cause no appeal had been taken from the portion of the lower court decree
involving it.
19 144 Ohio St 523, 528, 60 N.E. 2d 59, 62 (1945).
20144 Ohio St. 529, 60 NY. 2d 170 (1945).
21144 Ohio St. 529, 531, 60 N.. 2d 170, 172 (1945).
22 144 Ohio St. 529, 552, 60 NME. 2d 170, 181 (1945).
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We are of the opinion that the foregoing excerpt from the
finding and order of the board of revision does not justify
a finding that the machinery in question was made acces-
sory to the land-something which could readily be used
by a succeeding tenant.
This view was adopted in the holding on mats and foundations: 23
The record discloses that to prevent vibration and to keep
the machinery in true alignment, it is fastened to the floor
and in many instances concrete mats or foundations are
placed under the heavy machines. Such mats or foundations
are not building foundations and according to our under-
standing of the record in this case may not be considered
as improvements to the land. Indeed, were the steel plant
abandoned such mats would constitute encumbrances
rather than improvements.
As to the test of intention, the holding that mats and foundations
were not improvements lays to rest any theory that the mode of
attachment alone may raise the inference that the party affixing the
chattel intended to annex it permanently to the land.24 Obviously
these foundations could not be removed without destruction.
Further, the court indicated by dictum that no inference could
be raised from the fact that the person affixing the chattel was a
tenant rather than a landowner when it said,25
If the property be improvements on land owned by the
manufacturer, similar property must be held to be improve-
ments on land when erected on the land of another, other-
wise we would be confronted with a purposeful discrimina-
tion contrary to the Federal Constitution.
The principle of law governing classification of property for tax
purposes is stated in syllabus 7 as follows:
The general principle to be kept in view in determining
whether what was once a chattel has become a fixture is
the distinction between the business which is carried on
in or upon the premises, and the premises. The former is
personal in its nature, and articles that are merely acces-
sory to the business, and have been put on the premises for
this purpose, and not as accessions to the real estate, retain
the personal character of the principal to which they belong
and are subservient. But articles which have been annexed
to the premises as accessory to it, whatever business may
be carried on upon it, and not peculiarly for the benefit of a
present business which may be of a temporary duration, be-
23 144 Ohio St. 529, 554, 60 N.E. 2d 170, 181 (1945).
24 Cf. Teaff v. Hewitt. In Zangerle v. Standard Oil Company, supra, counsel
for the company conceded that foundations were real property thus avoiding
the question in that case.
25 144 Ohio St. 529, 535, 60 N.E. 2d 170, 173 (1945).
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come subservient to the realty and acquire and retain its
legal character. (Statement of Judge White in Fortman V.
Goepper, 14 Ohio St., 558, 567, approved and followed.)
In Roseville Pottery, Inc. v. County Board of Revision of Mus-
kingum County26 and the accompanying Mosaic Tile case decided
in the same opinion, the court was given the opportunity three years
later to reappraise the position taken in the three cases set forth
above. Again the taxpayer owned the land upon which the property
in question was affixed.
The principal items before the court were tunnel kilns used by
the taxpayers in the manufacture of decorated art ware, floor tile,
wall tile, and bathroom accessories. The Roseville kiln was about 245
feet long, 10 feet wide and about 10 feet high. The six kilns belonging
to Mosaic ranged from 265 feet to 340 feet long, and were about 11
feet wide and 7 feet high. As described by the court,
27
The kilns stand on cement slabs in solid connection
with the floors of the buildings in which the kilns are
located. They are built with outsides of either common
brick or metal, about four inches thick, and next to the
brick or metal, in each kiln, is an insulating layer followed
by another layer of refractory material. The kilns are held
together by steel buck stays. In the concrete slab, upon
which each kiln rests, are laid narrow-gauge tracks. The
molded damp clay is loaded on cars which are pushed on
these tracks through the kilns. The pushing is accomplished
by an hydraulic ram which pushes one car and, after the
car is in the kiln a certain distance, pushes another behind
it, and so on in a continuous operation. In this way, the ware
which is being manufactured is preheated, fired and cooled.
Glazed ware goes through the kiln twice * * *.
All the kilns were designed by engineers for specific
ceramic manufacture and cannot be used in other industries
or for the manufacture of different ceramic ware unless
changed entirely in design. They can be knocked down and
moved to other locations and the records recite several
instances where similar kilns have been so handled. Trade
papers advertise kilns of this sort for sale and removal. The
tracks in the kiln can be removed, although the cement
slab, left after moving a kiln, is demolished by the removal
of the tracks.
It will be noted that this equipment differs primarily from that be-
fore the court in the preceding three cases in that it was constructed
principally of masonry rather than steel.
Again the court held that the property in question was not "land
or improvements thereon." The court, as before, adopted the three
26 Note 4, Supra.
27 149 Ohio St. 89, 91, 77 N.E. 2d 608, 610 (1948).
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tests laid down in Teaff v. Hewitt.2 8 There was unquestioned af-
fixation to freehold and the kilns could not be removed except by
knocking them down and sacrificing the outer shell of common brick.
Here again, however, the court stressed the importance of the ap-
propriation test in determining the classification of the property.
Since the kilns were placed on the land only for the purpose of
carrying on the ceramic business and would not be useful in any
other business, they were not accessory to the use of the real estate
as such and were therefore not appropriated to the real estate.
The case has a further significance in that in a supplementary
brief the county argued that there was no constitutional question
involved but rather a question of statutory construction. Section
5322, General Code, made taxable as real property "not only the
land itself, * * * but also, unless otherwise specified, all buildings,
structures, improvements and fixtures of whatever kind thereon,
and all rights and privileges belonging or appertaining thereto
* * * ." It was argued that the kilns were either buildings or
structures; that they were not within the description "all engines
and machinery of every description, used or designed to be used,
in refining or manufacturing, and all tools and implements of every
kind used, or designed to be used, for such purposes owned or used
by such manufacturer" required by Sections 5386 and 5388, General
Code, to be listed for taxation as personal property; and that, there-
fore, not being "otherwise specified" they were taxable as real
property. The court disagreed with this contention and held that
they were "implements used in manufacturing." The law of the case
as regards this point is stated in syllabus 2 as follows:
Such tunnel kilns are implements used in manufacturing,
within the meaning of Section 5388, General Code, which
requires the listing and assessing of such implements,
etc., at 50 per cent of their true value, and are, thereby,
otherwise specified within the meaning of Section 5322,
General Code, which provides that, unless otherwise speci-
fied, all structures, etc., on lands are real property.
A careful study of these cases indicates that the court realized
that for the purposes of taxation it was faced with a different prob-
lem than the determination of the rights of private parties in or to
property. In taxation matters it was essential that there be enunci-
ated a rule or principle which could be objectively applied to pro-
duce a uniform result with as little attention to collateral facts as
possible. If the intention of private parties were to be accepted as
the principal test for taxation, it would obviously open the door to
evasion and discriminatory treatment within the classes intended to
28 1 Ohio St. 511 (1653).
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be uniformly benefited. Moreover, the tax assessor could not be
charged with the burden of examining private agreements or cir-
cumstances of tenure or otherwise, evidencing the intention of the
parties as to the nature of the property affixed to the land. The
classification of property for taxation could not depend upon the in-
tention of the taxpayer without introducing utter confusion into the
tax structure and its administration. Nor could such classification
depend upon the manner and mode of affixation if the objective of
the classified personal property tax law were to be realized.
Having the remedial objectives of the law in mind, it becomes
clear why the court placed emphasis upon the appropriation test,
subordinating matters of affixation, ready removability or intention
of the party making the affixation. In no other way could the court
have applied the criterion of Teaff v. Hewitt to produce a principle
which could be uniformly applied to determine the classification of
property for taxation. The court, therefore, adopted an intrinsically
practical test which does not depart from the fundamentals of the
earlier cases but which emphasizes that as to industrial property,
the question is whether the article annexed was accessory to the
particular business carried on rather than to the land itself. This
principle obviously embraces all of the productive facilities of in-
dustry and agriculture thus carrying out the intention of Section
5388, General Code, which specifies that the benefits of taxation at
50% of true value shall include the engines, machinery, tools and
implements of manufacturers, refiners, processors and farmers.
In order to evaluate these decisions it will be helpful to examine
the guides available to the supreme court in arriving at the con-
clusions reached. The first guide was the statutory history which
has been summarized in the earlier pages hereof.2 9
The second guide was set forth in the change made in the Con-
stitution itself. As pointed out above, Article XII, Section 2, which
had provided that "Laws shall be passed, taxing by uniform rule
* * * real and personal property according to its true value in
money * * * " was changed to provide that "Lands and improve-
ments thereon shall be taxed by uniform rule according to value."
A purpose must have motivated the change in terms used. "Land
and improvements thereon" was obviously intended to be more
restrictive than the broad term "real property." It seems natural
that the word "improvements" was used in the sense of something
added to benefit the land on which it was located. The language
adopted in the constitutional amendment is significant, in view of
the purposes of the constitutional amendment to enable the favoring
of manufactures and farmers; the long line of decisions in this state
29 See third page of this article.
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making the decisive test whether the manufacturing equipment an-
nexed was of general benefit to the land and the very broad language
of Section 5322 as it existed for many years. It aptly indicates an
intention to require uniformity only with respect to things annexed
to the land which are of general and permanent benefit to it. In fact,
"improvement" may be definitive of a physical benefit whereas the
accessory doctrine is dependent upon the relationship of the use of
the annexed property. At least Judge Turner in the Republic Steel
case considered that the massive concrete foundation mat underlying
a continuous strip steel rolling mill which could not be removed
without damaging the land if the industry abandoned the site was
actually a detriment rather than an improvement to the land. In any
event, the court decided as set forth in the second syllabus of the
Republic Steel case:
2. The term 'improvements' in the sentence found in
Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution reading 'Land
and improvements thereon shall be taxed by uniform rule
according to value' contemplates something which creates
a permanent benefit to the land.
The definition of "improvements" by the court is in line with the
well settled meaning of the word used in connection with lands. In
American Jurisprudence, 29a it is stated: "Generally speaking, the
word improvement' may be said to include everything that enhances
the value of premises permanently for general uses."
In Arkansas, there is a provision in the Constitution, Article
XII, Section 3, which exempts homesteads up to a certain value
from sale on execution but with the proviso that there shall be no
exemption from execution for the payment of obligations contracted,
among other things, for improvements on homesteads. In Greenwood
& Son v. Maddox & Toms,30 the Arkansas Supreme Court held that
a steam engine and machinery were not improvements within the
meaning of the Constitution, saying that:
Supplies for the purpose of carrying on a trade or business,
and which were not furnished directly as betterments to
the realty, although they may be placed upon the home-
stead, are not such as is contemplated by law as advanced
for the erection of and as improvements thereon.
In Williamson v. Jones, the question of the meaning of improvements
on land arose with reference to the right of a trespasser to set off
improvements erected by him in an action against him for waste by
the true owner. The court said that: 3 1 "An allowable improvement
29a27 Am. JuR. 260.
30 27 Ark. 648 (1872).
31 43 W. Va. 562, 27 S.E. 411 (1897).
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must be that which adds to--enhances the value of-the land per-
manently for general uses; * * * ." To the same effect are Cuflop v.
Leonard, 32 Eagle Oil Corp. v. Cohassett Oil Corp. et al,33 City of Vic-
toria v. Victoria County,34 Proctor v. Maine Central R.R. Co.,35 Lake
Whatcom Logging Co. v. Calvert.36
The third guide available to the supreme court in arriving at its
decisions was the statutory framework of property taxation. As
stated above, a principal consideration in the amendment of the
Constitution which permitted a departure from uniformity in the
taxation of property other than land and improvements was the
objective of affording a more favorable tax climate for industry and
farming. The statutory changes made subsequent to the constitu-
tional amendment obviously considered this purpose paramount.
Section 5322, General Code, which defined "real property" and
"land" included within those terms "all buildings, structures, im-
provements, and fixtures of whatever kind thereon," unless other-
wise specified. This section was retained in its previous form but
the legislature then "otherwise specified" with respect to the
property intended to be specially treated taxwise, by enacting
Sections 5386 and 5388. These sections make up a part of the listing
provisions under the personal property law. Section 5386 required
that:
* * * A manufacturer shall also list all engines and ma-
chinery of every description used, or designed to be used,
in refining or manufacturing, and all tools and implements
of every kind used, or designed to be used, for such pur-
pose, owned or used by such manufacturer.
Continuing in Section 5388, General Code, the legislature, after
providing that personal property used in business should be listed
and assessed at 70% of the true value thereof, provided that "All
engines, machinery, tools and implements of a manufacturer * * *
and all engines, machinery, tools, implements and domestic animals
used in agriculture * * * " except such as "may have been legally
regarded as improvements on land and considered in arriving at the
value of real property assessed for taxation," should be listed and
assessed at 50% of the true value thereof.
In the Standard Oil and Republic Steel cases the court did not
feel it necessary to make any distinction between the enumerated
kinds of property but in the Pottery cases the court concluded that
32 97 Va. 256, 33 S. E. 611 (1899).
33 263 Mich. 371, 248 N.W. 840 (1933).
34 103 Texas 477, 129 SE. 593 (1910).
36 101 Me. 459, 64 AtI. 839 (1906).
36 33 Wash. 126, 73 Pac. 1128 (1903).
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the kilns were properly to be regarded as "implements" of the
business. In any event the cases make it clear that to be "otherwise
specified" the items of property must fall within one of the enumerat-
ed kinds,-engines, machinery, tools or implements.
The fourth guide which the court had was the case law which
had developed over the preceding 100 years as to what was legally
to be regarded as improvements on land.
The state of the law existing at the time of the adoption of the
constitutional amendment and the enactment of the legislation in-
volved was, of course, of prime importance in reaching a true under-
standing of what the people and the legislature did as expressed in
these changes in the fundamental and statutory law. It should be
emphasized that prior to the amendment the distinction between real
and personal property was of no importance in taxation hence there
were no cases available in the tax field. Only cases involving the
law of fixtures were available for this purpose.
In Teaff v. Hewitt,37 the leading case in Ohio .on the law of
fixtues, Chief Justice Bartley laid down the following criterion of a
fixture:
1st. Actual annexation to the realty, or something ap-
purtenant thereto.
2nd. Appropriation to the use or purpose of that
part of the realty with which it is connected.
3rd. The intention of the party making the annexation,
to make the article a permanent accession to the freehold-
this intention being inferred from the nature of the article
affixed, the relation and situation of the party making the
annexation, the structure and mode of annexation, and the
purpose or use for which the annexation has been made.
Adopting this as the criterion, there will be found no
occasion for giving an ambiguous meaning to the term
fixture; no occasion for denominating an article a fixture
at one period of time, which with the same annexation
would not be such at another period; no occasion for deter-
mining that to be a fixture as between vendor and vendee
which under like circumstance would not be such as be-
tween landlord and tenant; * * *
The observations of Chief Justice Bartley in the last paragraph
quoted above are obviously general in nature and must be taken as
such. The case did not involve a matter of taxation, with which the
court was concerned in the recent cases, but was a controversy as to
whether a mortgage of real property covered certain manufacturing
machinery which had been levied on by judgment creditors of the
mortgagor. For tax purposes uniformity of application of principle
is paramount and intention of private parties cannot control the
371 Ohio St. 511 (1853).
19501
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
incidence of the tax. In litigation between private parties, intention
may be decisive as to whether an article affixed to realty becomes
a part of it. Agreements between the parties as well as estoppel have
been the bases of decisions and in the proper type of case where the
affixation was by a tenant, an inference may arise from the relation
of the parties, as a tenant is less likely to intend to affix a chattel
permanently to the land than is a landowner. The court in the recent
cases, being concerned with principles susceptible of uniform ap-
plication in the field of taxation, had no occasion to adopt any part
of the intention test which might be dependent upon private agree-
ment or relation of the parties.
Fortman v. Goeppe s3 8 involved the question of whether a large
copper kettle installed in a brewery was real or personal property.
Although the kettle was so large that it had to be put in position in
separate pieces and would have to be taken apart to remove it, the
court held it to be personal, saying: 3 9
The general principle to be kept in view, underlying all
questions of this kind, is the distinction between the busi-
ness which is carried on in or upon the premises, and the
premises, or locus in quo. The former is personal in its
nature, and articles that are merely accessory to the busi-
ness, and have been put on the premises for this purpose,
and not as accessions to the real estate, retain the personal
character of the principal to which they appropriately be-
long and are subservient. But articles which have been
annexed to the premises as accessory to it, whatever busi-
ness may be carried on upon it, and not peculiarly for the
benefit of a present business which may be of a temporary
duration, become subservient to the realty and acquire
and retain its legal character.
Wagner v. Cleveland and Toledo Railroad Co. 40 held that the
railroad which had only an easement across the land had the right
to remove stone piers upon which it had erected a bridge, as against
the owner of the fee.
Case Manufacturing Company v. Garven41 was concerned with
whether certain machinery and equipment purchased and affixed as
a part of a flour mill remained personal property or became part
of the realty. Two types of equipment were involved which are dis-
tinguished by the court in the following quotation from the opinion:
The machinery furnishing the motive power is generally
more closely annexed to the freehold, and of a more per-
manent nature, as the power furnished by it may be
38 14 Ohio St. 558 (1863).
39 Supra, Note 38, at p. 567.
40 22 Ohio St. 563 (1872).
4145 Ohio St. 289, 299, 13 N.E. 493, 496 (1887).
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adapted to the propulsion of the machinery of a variety
of mills without any substantial change in the motive power
itself or in the building other than by substituting one
kind of machinery for another; whilst the machinery that
is propelled, has more of the general character of per-
sonalty, is not as a rule so closely annexed to the freehold,
and may be removed, and frequently is, from one mill to
another, as any other article of personalty; and is more
properly 'accessory to the business' carried on upon the
realty than to the realty itself.
Of course, these cases do not constitute all of the case law on
fixtures in Ohio but they did set a uniform and consistent pattern of
fixture law as concerned industrial property. Each of the cases was
founded upon the criterion expressed in Teaff v. Hewitt and over the
period of years made clear the importance of the appropriation test.
Running throughout these cases is the principle more recently ex-
pressed in the fourth syllabus of Zangerle v. Standard Oil Company42
as follows:
4. The decisive test of appropriation is whether the
chattel under consideration in any case is devoted primarily
to the business conducted on the premises, or whether it is
devoted primarily to the use of the land upon which the
business is conducted.
A reading of the cases cited beginning with Teaff v. Hewitt, all
prior to the constitutional and statutory changes, shows clearly
that in considering chattels affixed to land by industry:
(a) The mode of annexation alone will not determine the
character of the property annexed although some form of
annexation is necessary to create a fixture.
(b) The general principle to be kept in mind, underlying all
questions of fixture law is the distinction between the
business which is carried on, in or upon the land, and the
land itself. The business is personal in nature whereas the
land is real estate. Those articles which are merely ac-
cessory to the particular business which have been put upon
the premises for the purpose of that business are not ac-
cessory to the real estate but retain their personal nature.
By the same token articles which are placed upon the
premises as accessory to it rather than for the benefit of
the particular business carried on thereon, and which may
continue to benefit the premises if the present business is
removed, become subservient to the realty and acquire its
legal character. This is the test of appropriation.
(c) The intention of the party making the annexation is to
be determined from the nature of the article annexed rather
than the mode of annexation, the relation and situation of
the party making the annexation and the purpose for which
42 144 Ohio St. 506 (1945).
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it is made. As between private parties, intention may be
determined by specific agreement or by estoppel.
These principles derived from the case law, were in entire
harmony with the purpose of the legislation to provide special tax
treatment to industrial and farming property used in business.
PRESENT STATE or THE LAW
In the recent cases the court had before it not only the historical
background of discriminatory taxation against industry and agri-
culture, which brought about the constitutional amendment but a
well directed implementation of the purpose at which the amend-
ment had been aimed in the legislative provisions granting limited
tax advantages to those kinds of property of industry and agriculture
which had focused the necessity for relief. To this was added the
repeated examination of the principles of fixture law over the past
100 years.
It was not surprising to find the supreme court reiterating the
principles of these decisions in the recent decisions dealing with an-
nexations of articles of industrial property. The only innovation
necessary to adapt these principles to the determination of classifi-
cation of property for tax purposes was the elimination of any con-
sideration of private agreements which obviously could not be bind-
ing upon the state and this deletion must necessarily be assumed
though the court has not yet been called upon to determine the
question.
In the present state of the law it seems clear that not all in-
dustrial structures and equipment may be classified as personal
property and taxed at 50% of true value. To qualify for such a tax
status such items of property must (1) be specifically designed or
suited to a particular business carried on upon the premises and not
suited to other businesses which might utilize the premises in the
event of abandonment of the present business, and (2) be one of the
kinds of property specified in Section 5388, General Code, viz.:
engines, machinery, tools or implements.
This being true, it is equally clear that buildings which are
defined in Section 5322 as real property are not to be accorded classi-
fication advantages since they are not "otherwise specified" in
Section 5388 or in any other section of the code.
The same conclusion seems inevitable in the case of certain
machinery such as steam boilers and electric generators designed
for general production of power and suitable to a variety of busi-
nesses which might utilize the premises to which they are annexed.
This distinction has been consistently made in the case law and was
observed in the Standard Oil, Republic Steel and Pottery cases, all
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of which rely on the fixture cases referred to above in determining
the meaning of "improvements" in the constitutional provision.
That the supreme court is alert to the limits intended by the
people and prescribed by the legislature in the field of classification
of property for taxation appears from the recent decision in Reed v.
County Board of Revision43 in which the court held that cottages
erected by a lessee on land owned by the state were "buildings" and
as such were not "otherwise specified" in the code, and consequently
to be taxed as real property.
Before these decisions there was considerable confusion in the
thinking of both laymen and lawyers as to whether affixation of an
article to the land or building was not sufficient alone to make the
article taxable as real estate. Many are the cases and varied are the
decisions of the different courts as to whether affixation with nails
or with screws or with bolts or with cleats or even weight alone is
not sufficient to constitute the article real property. Some cases
consider size alone sufficient to determine the question, while others
go off on the materials of which the article was constructed. Still
other cases are determined by the extent of injury either to the
freehold or to the article itself in its removal. The court brushes
aside as incidental all of these circumstances and holds that the
function of the thing annexed or the purpose in making the an-
nexation, frequently referred to as "appropriation," is the determin-
ing test. This test is simple, clear, and easy of application and may be
summarized thus:
The business of manufacture itself is personal in character as
distinguished from the use of the land as such. Consequently, an
article designed for and appropriated to the particular manufactur-
ing business carried on in or upon the premises is personal in its
nature, whereas articles which have been annexed to the premises as
accessory to it, whatever business is there carried on and not pe-
culiarly for the benefit of the present business, becomes subservient
to the realty and acquires and retains its legal character. This test is
but theapplication of commonsenseto thelaw as ithasdeveloped over
the past 100 years. The court recognizes that only in such a way
could equality and uniformity be achieved in the taxation of property
of manufacturers. It recognizes that one manufacturer may utilize
only light portable machinery and implements in his manufacturing
process while another may be obliged to employ huge and
ponderous machinery and implements; or that the machines or im-
plements of one might be constructed of metal and those of another
of necessity might be constructed of masonry or ceramics. Some
require physical attachment to the building or land to hold them in
43 152 Ohio St. 207, 88 N.E. 2d 701 (1949).
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place or they could not be operated; others do not. To treat one
manufacturer differently from another because of any of these
fortuitous circumstances would be unjustifiable discrimination which
never could have been intended, if indeed it could be done validly.
The supreme court decisions merely recognize that all implements
specially designed for a particular business, whether manufacturing,
refining or farming, regardless of size, shape, construction or af-
fixation, and regardless of materials used, must be given similar
treatment in their taxation.
